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Deference Debate and the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis
in Financial Regulation: MetLife v. Financial Stability
Oversight Council
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”) to reform the financial regulatory system in the United States.1
One of Dodd-Frank’s primary additions to the financial industry is the
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC” or “the
Council”), which is charged with monitoring the financial industry to
ensure that financial institutions do not pose systemic risk.2 The critical
regulatory power of FSOC is its ability to designate nonbank financial
institutions as “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (“SIFI”)
and subject them to increased regulation by the Federal Reserve Board
(“the Fed”).3 Once designated, a firm may only shed the SIFI
designation if it proves that the SIFI designation was “arbitrary and
capricious.”4
In December 2014, FSOC voted to designate MetLife, Inc.
(“MetLife”)5 a SIFI.6 MetLife was the fourth nonbank to be designated
a SIFI, following American Insurance Group (“AIG”), General Electric
Capital Corporation (“GE”),7 and Prudential Financial, Inc.
1. David Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation,
HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (July 7, 2010),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-regulationlegislation/ (giving a history of the Dodd-Frank reform legislation).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(a)–(b) (2015).
3. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1).
4. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h).
5. MetLife is a U.S. based, global provider of insurance, annuities, and employee
benefit programs. See generally About MetLife, METLIFE, https://www.metlife.com/about/
index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
6. Eric Garcia, MetLife Faces Challenge to Overturn ‘Systemically Important’
Designation, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 14, 2015, 9:36 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/metlife-bfaces-challenge-to-overturn-systemically-important-designation-2015-01-13.
7. On June 28, 2016, GE subsequently successfully shed its SIFI designation by
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(“Prudential”).8 On January 13, 2015, MetLife challenged FSOC’s
designation in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, arguing that the decision to designate MetLife was “arbitrary
and capricious.”9 In MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight
Council,10 the D.C. District Court agreed.11 In reaching its
determination, the court concluded that while MetLife was eligible to be
designated as a SIFI, FSOC’s designation was arbitrary and capricious
because it both deviated from its own guidance “without
acknowledgement or explanation” and also failed to consider the
regulatory cost that SIFI designation would impose on MetLife.12
FSOC appealed the court’s ruling, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit heard oral arguments on October 24,
2016.13 While possible to frame the Circuit Court’s pending decision in
terms of the extent of administrative mistakes on FSOC’s part, the
appellate process has unearthed fundamental debates over the degree of
deference that should be given to FSOC in its designation analysis as
well as the role of cost-benefit analysis in FSOC’s methodology.14
This Note examines the district court’s decision and discusses
the issues raised on both sides of the appeal. This Note proceeds in five
parts. Part II describes the purpose of FSOC and its SIFI designation
process.15 Part III discusses both FSOC’s rationale for designating
MetLife as a SIFI and the district court’s ruling.16 Part IV details the
arguments raised on appeal and explores the merits of the arguments.17
Part V concludes with a discussion of the possible outcome of the
liquidating a significant portion of its financial business. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Treas., Financial Stability Oversight Council Announces Rescission of Nonbank Financial
Company Designation (June 29, 2016).
8. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Financial Stability Oversight Council
Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY., (June 29, 2016, 9:48 AM), https://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#nonbank.
9. See Paige Brewin, MetLife’s SIFI Designation and Appeal, 34 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 435, 440 (2015).
10. 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 231 (D.D.C. 2016).
11. See id. at 230.
12. Id.
13. Oral Argument Calendar, U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., https://
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/sixtyday.nsf/fullcalendar?OpenView&count=1000
(last
modified Jan. 20, 2017 5:30 AM).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.

2017]

METLIFE V. FSOC

255

appeal.18
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE CREATION OF
FSOC
A.

Origins of FSOC and Its Purpose

One of the consistent criticisms of federal financial regulation,
prior to Dodd-Frank, was the fragmentation and “meaningless formal
separation lines among various segments of the financial industry.”19
Despite this criticism, Dodd-Frank largely retained the existing
fragmented regulatory structure of the financial system.20 Instead of
overhauling the regulatory structure, legislators created FSOC in an
attempt to identify and combat systemic risk.21
Dodd-Frank established FSOC with three stated purposes: (1)
“to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could
arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities,
of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial
companies, or that could arise outside the financial services
marketplace”; (2) “to promote market discipline”; and (3) “to respond to
emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system.”22
There are ten voting members of FSOC, each the head of a
major regulatory agency, as well as one member appointed by the
President.23 The members include the Secretary of the Treasury (who
serves as the Chairperson of the Council), Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Comptroller of the Currency,
Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Chairperson of

See infra Part V.
Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-Frank Act, A New Deal for a New Age?, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 83, 87 (2011) (explaining that the US silo-based regulatory system, where
financial institutions are place in mutually exclusive regulatory categories, “allows for
companies to incur high levels of risk hidden from regulators,” as they are restricted to their
respective regulatory silo).
20. Id. While the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTC) was eliminated and merged with
the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), all of the other agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
were left intact. Id.
21. Id. at 88–89.
22. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
112, 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2015).
23. Dodd-Frank § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1).
18.
19.

256

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

the Securities and Exchange Commission, Chair of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Chairperson of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, and the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration
Board, as well as one member with insurance expertise appointed by the
President, with advice and consent of the Senate, to serve a six-year
term.24 Additionally, five nonvoting members serve in an advisory
capacity.25
B.

SIFI Designation Process

Section 113 of Dodd-Frank gives FSOC the ability to designate
certain nonbank financial companies as systemically important, and
subject them to regulation (or heightened regulation) by the Fed.26
These regulations, new for nonbank companies,27 can include risk-based
capital requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, resolution
plan and credit exposure report requirements, concentration limits, a
contingent capital requirement, enhanced public disclosures, short-term
debt limits, and overall risk management requirements.28
Under Dodd-Frank, a nonbank financial institution is defined as
a company that is incorporated or organized under United States law
and “predominantly engaged in financial activities.”29 There are two
independent tests under Section 102 of Dodd-Frank that determine

Id.
Dodd-Frank § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2). The nonvoting members are: the
Director of the Office of Financial Research; the Director of the Federal Insurance Office; a
State insurance commissioner, to be designated by a selection process determined by the
State insurance commissioners; a State banking supervisor to be designated by a selection
process determined by the State banking supervisors; and a State securities commissioner or
an officer performing like function, to be designated by a selection process determined by
such State securities commissioners. Dodd-Frank § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2).
26. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1).
27. Though the Fed already regulated banks and bank holding companies, this section
of Dodd-Frank marks a significant expansion of the Fed’s powers by including additional
nonbanks in its charge. See Bernard Shull, The Impact of Financial Reform on Fed. Reserve
Autonomy 7 (Levy Economics Inst. Working Paper No. 735, 2012), http://
www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_735.pdf (“On the recognition that the financial crisis
emanated, in part, from the risky activities of investment banks and insurance companies,
the Fed is also charged with supervising nonbank financial institutions designated as
systemically important (SIFIs) by the FSOC.”).
28. Dodd-Frank § 115, 12 U.S.C. § 5325(b).
29. Dodd-Frank § 102, 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(4)(B)(i)–(ii).
24.
25.
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whether a nonbank financial institution meets the “predominantly
engaged in financial activities” qualification.30 Under the first test, at
least 85% of the company’s consolidated annual gross revenues must be
“derived” from activities that are “financial in nature.”31 Under the
second test, at least 85% of the company’s consolidated assets must be
“related to activities that are financial in nature.”32 Section 4(k) of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, defines what constitutes activities
that are financial in nature.33
When evaluating a nonbank financial institution for potential
SIFI designation, Dodd-Frank requires FSOC to consider ten statutory
factors.34 Additionally, there is a catch-all provision, which requires
FSOC to consider “any other risk-related factors the Council deems
appropriate.”35 In 2012, FSOC issued its interpretive Guidance for
Nonbank Financial Company Designations (“Guidance”),36 which
compressed the ten statutory factors (and the additional risk-related
catch-all factor) into six categories: (1) interconnectedness; (2)
substitutability; (3) size; (4) leverage; (5) liquidity risk and maturity
mismatch; and (6) existing regulatory scrutiny.37 The first three of these
categories—size, substitutability, and interconnectedness—serve to

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Dodd-Frank §102, 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(6)(A)–(B).
Dodd-Frank §102, 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(6)(A).
Dodd-Frank §102, 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(6)(B).
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2015).
Dodd-Frank §113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2). The factors are: (A) “the extent of the
leverage of the company”; (B) the extent and nature of the off-balance-sheet exposures of
the company”; (C) “the extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the
company with other significant nonbank financial companies and significant bank holding
companies”; (D) the importance of the company as a source of credit for households,
businesses, and State and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the United
States financial system”; (E) the importance of the company as a source of credit for lowincome, minority, or underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of such
company would have on the availability of credit in such communities”; (F) the extent to
which assets are managed rather than owned by the company, and the extent to which
ownership of assets under management is diffuse”; (G) “the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the activities of the company”; (H) “the
degree to which the company is already regulated by 1 or more primary financial regulatory
agencies”; (I) “the amount and nature of the financial assets of the company”; and (J) “the
amount and types of the liabilities of the company, including the degree of reliance on shortterm funding.” Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2).
35. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2) (listing this factor as factor (K) in the
legislation).
36. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 1310, App. A (2016).
37. Id.
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gauge the potential impact of a nonbank financial company’s financial
distress on the overall economy.38 The second three—leverage, liquidity
risk and maturity mismatch, and existing regulatory scrutiny—serve to
examine the susceptibility of a company to material financial distress.39
In its Guidance, FSOC related that “material financial distress” exists
when a firm is in “imminent danger of insolvency or defaulting on its
financial obligations.”40
FSOC utilized this six-factor analytical framework to develop
two independently sufficient standards through which it can designate a
nonbank financial company as a SIFI.41 Both standards require a twothirds Council vote, including an affirmative vote from the Chairperson
of the Council.42 The first determination standard is satisfied “if
material financial distress at the nonbank financial company could pose
a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”43 The second
determination standard is satisfied if “the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the
nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the financial stability
of the United States.”44 While these standards are independent of one
another, FSOC noted that there could be significant overlap between the
outcome of an evaluation under each standard.45
Under the two determination standards, a “threat to financial
stability” occurs when there is an “impairment of financial
intermediation or of financial market functioning that would be
sufficiently severe to inflict significant damage on the broader
economy.”46 FSOC identified three channels through which a nonbank
financial company’s material financial distress could be transmitted
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 12 C.F.R. §1310, App. A.
42. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §

113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2015).
43. 12 C.F.R. §1310, App. A.
44. Id.
45. Id. (“The Council expects that there likely will be significant overlap between the
outcome of an assessment of a nonbank financial company under the First and Second
Determination Standards, because, in many cases, a nonbank financial company that could
pose a threat to U.S. financial stability because of the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of its activities could also pose a threat to U.S.
financial stability if it were to experience material financial distress.”).
46. Id.
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through the markets or to other firms, and thus cause damage to the
overall economy: (1) exposure, where “a nonbank financial company’s
creditors, counterparties, investors, or other market participants have
exposure to the nonbank financial company that is significant enough to
materially impair those creditors, counterparties, investors, or other
market participants”; (2) asset liquidation, where a “nonbank financial
company holds assets that, if liquidated quickly, would cause a fall in
asset prices and thereby significantly disrupt trading or funding in key
markets or cause significant losses or funding problems for other firms
with similar holdings”; and (3) critical function or service, where “a
nonbank financial company is no longer able or willing to provide a
critical function or service that is relied upon by market participants and
for which there are no ready substitutes.”47
The only legal recourse for this process offered to SIFIdesignated nonbank financial companies under Dodd-Frank48 is to
challenge FSOC’s final determination within thirty days in either the
United States district court for the judicial district in which the home
office of the company is located or the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.49 In order for a court to rescind the SIFI
designation, the designated company must prove that FSOC’s final
determination was “arbitrary and capricious.”50
III. METLIFE’S DESIGNATION AND THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT’S RULING
A.

FSOC Designation of MetLife and Rationale

On July 16, 2013, the Council notified MetLife that it was being
considered for SIFI designation.51 On October 3, 2014, MetLife
Id.
Companies are notified when they are under review for potential SIFI designation,
and can request an oral or written hearing during the process to argue against their
designation. See Financial Stability Oversight Council FAQ’s, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/nonbankfaq.aspx#8 (last updated Feb. 14, 2015). However, once designated, they must either
comply with FSOC or utilize the statutory legal recourse to shed SIFI designation. Id.
49. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h) (2015).
50. Id.
51. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BASIS FOR THE
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING METLIFE,
INC. 2 (2014) [hereinafter FINAL DETERMINATION], https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
47.
48.
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requested and FSOC granted, a hearing regarding its potential
designation.52 After reviewing and considering evidence from the
hearing, meetings with MetLife representatives,53 and additional
materials sent to the Council by MetLife, FSOC issued a report (“Final
Determination”) that designated MetLife a SIFI on December 18, 2014,
by a vote of nine to one, with Roy Woodall Jr.54 as the lone dissent.55
FSOC designated MetLife a SIFI under the first determination
standard.56 The Council’s basis for designating MetLife revolved
around the three risk transmission channels set forth in its Guidance: (1)
MetLife’s exposure to counterparties, creditors, investors, and other
market participants; (2) the possibility that if MetLife liquidated its
assets, it could trigger market disruptions or difficulties for firms with
similar holdings; and (3) MetLife’s inability to provide a critical service
or function relied upon by other firms.57 The designation did not imply
that MetLife was in any imminent danger of financial insolvency.58
Rather, the SIFI designation was taken as a precautionary measure, due
to FSOC’s opinion that material financial distress at MetLife, were it to
occur, could pose a threat to the broader economy.59
1. MetLife’s Exposure to Other Market Participants
In its Final Determination, the Council expressed concern with
the fact that large financial intermediaries have significant exposure to
MetLife “arising from the company’s institutional products and capital
markets activities, such as the funding agreements, general and separate
designations/Documents/MetLife%20Public%20Basis.pdf.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 2. Staff of Council members met with MetLife representatives twelve times
between September of 2013 and September of 2014. Id.
54. Financial Stability Oversight Council, S. Roy Woodall Jr., U.S. DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/council/Pages/roy_woodall.aspx
(last updated Oct. 23, 2012, 9:53 AM) (stating that Roy Woodall was nominated by
President Barack Obama to serve on FSOC as the independent voting member with
insurance expertise).
55. See Brewin, supra note 9, at 439.
56. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 4.
57. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 15.
58. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16.
59. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16 (“The Council’s final determination
does not constitute a conclusion that MetLife is experiencing, or is likely to experience,
material financial distress. Rather, the Council has determined that material financial
distress at the company, if it were to occur, could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.”).
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account [guaranteed investment contracts], pension closeouts, securities
lending agreements, and outstanding indebtedness.”60 Another concern
cited under the exposure transmission channel was the potential for
MetLife’s substantial number of worldwide policyholders61 to sustain
serious losses in the event of MetLife’s material financial distress.62
2. MetLife’s Asset Liquidation
The Council noted that if MetLife were to suffer material
financial distress, it could be forced to liquidate assets to meet its
financial obligations.63 Further, the Council noted that MetLife has
significant products that could be threatened by non-renewal or
termination by counterparties.64 Additionally, a substantial portion of
the company’s insurance liabilities can be surrendered in exchange for
cash value, and policy owners may borrow against their outstanding
policies.65 FSOC noted that MetLife’s leverage, deemed higher than
most of its peers, could instigate a large-scale forced liquidation of its
assets.66 In turn, such a liquidation of assets could disrupt trading and
impair market functioning, thus straining the overall economy.67
3. Ability to Perform a Critical Function or Service
While the Council noted that MetLife was the leader in the life
and health insurance market in the United States,68 it expressed the
opinion that the market was competitive enough for other participants to
absorb the impact of MetLife’s potential failure.69 The Council stated:
“MetLife’s share in these generally fragmented and competitive markets
FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16.
MetLife has approximately 100 million policy holders. FINAL DETERMINATION,
supra note 51, at 16.
62. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16.
63. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16.
64. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16.
65. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 4.
66. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16.
67. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16.
68. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 25. The Council noted that MetLife’s
market share in that segment was approximately 15%. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note
51, at 25. Further, MetLife was cited as a significant participant in the corporate benefit
funding and annuity product markets. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 25.
69. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 25.
60.
61.
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do not appear large enough to cause a significant disruption in the
provision of services if the company were to experience material
financial distress.”70
B.

MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council—The
District Court’s Ruling

Following its designation, MetLife utilized its legal remedy
under Dodd-Frank and filed a complaint arguing that FSOC’s Final
Determination was arbitrary and capricious.71 The District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled in MetLife’s favor on March 30, 2016,
rescinding MetLife’s SIFI designation.72
The court determined that MetLife was eligible for designation
as a SIFI under the statutory test established by Dodd-Frank,73 however,
it held that FSOC’s designation was arbitrary and capricious in two
ways: (1) by violating its own guidance in failing to assess MetLife’s
susceptibility to material financial distress before addressing the effects
of such distress, as well as by inconsistently applying its own
promulgated determination standards; and (2) by failing to consider the
regulatory cost to MetLife prior to making its designation.74 Following
the court’s ruling, FSOC appealed this ruling to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.75
1. FSOC’s Failure to Adhere to Its Own Guidance
The district court criticized the Council’s deviance from its own
guidance in MetLife’s designation in two ways.76 First, the court
reasoned that FSOC’s Guidance for designation divided six categories
of analysis into two distinct groups.77 As discussed earlier, the first
FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 25.
Complaint at *1–3, MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, 177 F.
Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2015) (No. 15–45).
72. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C.
2016).
73. Id. at 230.
74. Id. at 233–239.
75. Chris Bruce, MetLife Too-Big-To-Fail Case Set For October Argument, 107
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 08 at 286 (Aug. 29, 2016).
76. MetLife, Inc., 177 F.Supp.3d at 233–239.
77. See id.
70.
71.
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group—size, substitutability, and interconnectedness—was intended to
consider the possible impact of the nonbank financial company’s
financial distress on the U.S. economy.78 The second group: leverage,
liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and existing regulator structure
was intended to “determine the susceptibility of a nonbank financial
company to financial distress.”79 MetLife’s argument, which the court
agreed with, was that FSOC failed to address MetLife’s vulnerability to
financial distress before addressing the possible effects of that distress.80
In other words, FSOC used all six categories to examine the impact that
MetLife’s failure could have on the broader economy, instead of using
the first group to discuss the impact and the second to discuss MetLife’s
susceptibility to financial distress.81 The court noted that FSOC’s
Guidance established that only the second group of analytical categories
was intended to examine the impact of a company’s material financial
distress on the broader economy.82 However, the court reasoned that
FSOC’s Final Determination regarding MetLife was contradictory to
the Guidance, because it specified that all six categories were meant to
weigh the potential effects of a company’s material financial distress.83
The court found the deviation between FSOC’s Guidance and its Final
Determination “undeniably inconsistent” and thus rendered this aspect
of MetLife’s designation as arbitrary and capricious.84
Second, the court held that the Council inconsistently applied its
own methodology in its Final Determination by combining its two
different determination standards.85 The court remarked that FSOC
merely evaluated MetLife’s interconnectedness with other actors in the
market, and refrained from determining any possible loss.86 The court
further explained that FSOC’s analysis amounted to merely a

See id.
See id.
ROBERTO J. GONZALEZ ET AL., PAUL WEISS LLP, CLIENT ALERT: RESISTANCE IS NOT
ALWAYS FUTILE: THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT DEALS FSOC A SIGNIFICANT BLOW BY
RESCINDING METLIFE’S DESIGNATION (2016),
https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/
litigation/insurance/publications/resistance-is-not-always-futile-the-dc-district-court-dealsfsoc.aspx?id=21716.
81. MetLife, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 233–35.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 238.
86. Id.
78.
79.
80.
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summation of MetLife’s market exposures without considering
mitigating factors, and that it assumed that losses relating to those
exposures would inflict significant damage on the market and the
broader U.S. economy.87 In other words, the court found that FSOC’s
reasoning was in line with the second determination standard, where a
company’s nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness,
or mix of those activities alone was enough to pose a threat to the
financial stability of the United States.88 However, FSOC invoked the
first determination in its analysis, where it must be established that a
nonbank financial institution’s material financial distress could pose a
threat to the broader economy.89 Regarding FSOC’s deviance from its
own guidance, the court stated that FSOC was required to either
maintain its two promulgated standards, or explain its deviance from
them.90 Having done neither, the court found that FSOC’s reversed use
of its own standards was arbitrary and capricious.91
2. Failure to Consider Cost
In addition to finding that the Council’s two deviations from its
own guidance was arbitrary and capricious, the court offered one further
mistake on FSOC’s part: failure to consider the cost to MetLife of its
SIFI designation.92 The district court relied on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. Environmental Protection
Agency93 in determining that cost was a relevant factor for an
administrative agency to consider when deciding whether to regulate an
entity.94 The court noted that although cost was not explicitly
mentioned as a factor in the Dodd-Frank legislation pertaining to SIFI
designation,95 regulation is not “appropriate” if it does significantly
more harm than good, and thus a cost-benefit analysis must be
Id.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Michigan v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
MetLife, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 239.
However, Dodd-Frank does require a consideration of “all appropriate risk
factors.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 113, 12 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(K)(2015).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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conducted when designating SIFIs.96
After determining that cost was an applicable factor for the
Council to consider when deciding to designate a company, the court
deemed the Council’s decision to ignore cost arbitrary and capricious.97
In reaching this determination, the court noted Dodd-Frank’s
“command” to consider all appropriate risk factors in Section
113(a)(2)(K).98 The court’s analysis centered on MetLife’s argument,
which FSOC failed to address, that imposing billions of dollars in cost
due to increased regulation could actually leave the company more
vulnerable to material financial distress.99 In this regard, the court held
that because FSOC did not consider cost as part of its designation
calculus, determining whether the designation caused more harm than
good was “impossible,” and thus the Final Determination was arbitrary
and capricious.100
3. Pending Appeal
FSOC appealed the ruling, claiming the court’s reasoning was
“profoundly mistaken,” and that the decision left “one of the largest,
most complex, and most interconnected financial companies in the
country” without vital regulatory oversight deemed necessary by
Congress.101 The D.C. Circuit heard arguments on October 24, 2016.102
The three judge panel selected to hear the arguments included Judges
Sri Srinivasan and Patricia Millett, both appointed by President Barack
Obama, as well as Judge Raymond Randolph, who was appointed by
President George W. Bush.103

MetLife, Inc. 177 F.Supp.3d at 240.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brief of Appellant at *1–2, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No.
16-5086, 2016 WL 3356866 (C.A.D.C. June 16, 2016).
102. Oral Argument Calendar, supra note 13.
103. Andrew Ackerman, Majority of Judges in MetLife Appeal Appointed by Obama,
WALL ST. J., (Sept. 26, 2016, 3:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/majority-of-judgesin-metlife-appeal-appointed-by-obama-1474916670.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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IV. THE CRITICAL ISSUES UNDERLYING METLIFE V. FSOC ON APPEAL
One possible view of the district court’s decision is that FSOC
committed an “administrative foot-fault” in its analysis by mixing its
determination standards.104 Under this view, FSOC could simply rework
its analysis and re-designate MetLife using a more stringent analysis.105
However, the issues raised on appeal suggest that there are fundamental
questions underlying FSOC’s designation framework, including the
level of deference that FSOC is to be allowed in its designation analysis,
as well as the role of cost-benefit analysis in FSOC’s judgments.106 The
debate over deference as well as the role of cost-benefit analysis, and
the merits of the competing arguments, are explored further in this Part.
A.

The Level of Deference Shown to FSOC

One of the key issues that arises from this case is the level of
deference that courts should give to FSOC in its designation analysis.107
Deference to FSOC manifests itself in two specific ways: (1) the extent
FSOC is required to assess the degree of MetLife’s vulnerability to
material financial distress108 and (2) the extent to which FSOC must
assess the impact of MetLife’s distress on the broader economy.109
1. Extent of Vulnerability Analysis Required by FSOC
The regulatory view, espoused by FSOC in its appellate brief, is
that neither Dodd-Frank nor the Guidance requires FSOC to assess the
probability of a company’s vulnerability to financial distress or
losses.110 FSOC argued that the statutory language in Dodd-Frank was
created with the intent of regulating in light of the “inherent uncertainty
of financial crises” and that the statute only requires an assertion of

GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
See Chris Bruce, MetLife-FSOC On Appeal: Four Issues to Watch, 107 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 14 at 507 (Oct. 17, 2016).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Reply Brief for Appellant, at *11–13, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight
Council, No. 16-5086, 2016 WL 3356866 (C.A.D.C. Sept. 09, 2016).
110. Id. at *23.
104.
105.
106.
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whether a company’s material financial distress could pose a threat to
the economy, not necessarily a detailed forecast of an impending
company collapse and its effects.111
Similarly, the FSOC articulated that its Guidance did not
establish that it would examine the probability that a company would
experience financial distress.112 Rather, the Guidance categories are
“interrelated” and that the three vulnerability categories created by the
Guidance are intended to “shed light on the effects that distress could
have on the company,” and how the company might respond if faced
with material financial distress.113
In contrast, MetLife argued that FSOC, in its Final Designation,
violated its Guidance and Dodd-Frank’s statutory framework by failing
to assess MetLife’s vulnerability to material financial distress.114
MetLife claimed that FSOC made an “unambiguous commitment” in
both its Final Determination and interpretive Guidance to assess the
likelihood of the potential SIFI experiencing material financial
distress.115
Furthermore, MetLife insisted that Section 113(a)(2) of DoddFrank requires an assessment of a company’s susceptibility to material
financial distress.116 FSOC is required to consider vulnerability as an
“appropriate risk-related factor” under Section 113(a)(2)(K); it would be
unreasonable for FSOC to subject a company to the costs and burdens
111. Id. (“[A]lthough the Council’s analysis was based on extensive qualitative and
quantitative analyses, the Council recognized that ‘financial crises can be hard to predict and
can have far reaching and unanticipated consequences.” The statute directs the Council to
determine whether a company’s material financial distress ‘could pose a threat,’ and does
not contemplate that he Council will forecast the collapse of the next financial bubble and
predict the specific effects it will have on particular companies.”). Reply Brief for
Appellant, supra note 109, at *41–44.
112. FSOC noted that the district court misinterpreted the guidance as requiring FSOC
to conduct a separate analysis regarding the likelihood of financial distress at MetLife. Id.
FSOC stated that “While the Council’s guidance identified specific issues that it intended to
address in considering the statutory factors, it never stated that it would perform a separate
analysis of the type envisioned by the district court.” Id.
113. Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at *29.
114. Brief for Appellee at *23, MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council,
201 No. 16-5086 (C.A.D.C. Aug. 15, 2016).
115. Id. MetLife’s appellate brief also charged FSOC with revisionism, stating that its
discussion of leverage, liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and existing regulatory
scrutiny in its initial appellate brief was not intended to be analyzed regarding the effects of
a company’s financial distress on other market participants and broader economy. Id. at
*26.
116. Id. at *29.
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of enhanced federal oversight in the absence of a plausible risk that the
company will actually experience material financial distress.117
Finally, MetLife asserted that FSOC improperly assumed that
distress at MetLife was more severe than the definition of material
financial distress in its interpretive Guidance and
Final
118
Essentially, MetLife posited that FSOC abandoned
Determination.
its own definition of material financial distress, defined in its final rule
and interpretive Guidance as “imminent danger of insolvency,” and
instead assuming more dire levels of distress.119 MetLife argued that
FSOC “moved the goalposts” in order to craft an effective SIFI
designation for MetLife.120
2. Failure to Quantify How MetLife’s Distress Could Impact the
Broader Economy
Keeping with its statutory requirements and Guidance, FSOC’s
argument is that it assessed whether MetLife’s material financial
distress could pose a threat to the overall U.S. financial system.121
FSOC focused on the ways that MetLife’s distress could impact the
economy.122 FSOC contended that the district court “did not question”
FSOC’s conclusion that MetLife’s material financial distress could pose
a threat to U.S. financial stability, but faulted the regulatory body for
not predicting “what the losses would be” or “how the market would
destabilize” as a consequence of MetLife’s distress.123 FSOC claimed
that its Guidance “contains no suggestions” that it must delineate the
specific causes and effects of MetLife’s failure.124 Furthermore, FSOC
suggested that its analysis went beyond a summation of MetLife’s
assets and exposures as found by the district court.125
MetLife alternatively argued that FSOC’s final designation
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *32.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *32.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *39.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *41–44 (noting that “Metlife could
destabilize the financial system” through exposure transmission and asset liquidation
channels).
123. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *46.
124. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *47.
125. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *47.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
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analysis regarding exposure and asset liquidation was inconsistent with
the
Final
its interpretive Guidance and Dodd-Frank.126 In
Determination and interpretive Guidance, FSOC stated that material
financial distress at a nonbank financial company could pose a systemic
risk to U.S. financial stability only if “an impairment of financial
intermediation or of financial market functioning” was sufficiently
“severe to inflict significant damage on the broader economy.”127
According to MetLife, FSOC abandoned this analytical standard by
simply tallying raw exposures and total assets while refusing to assess
potential losses from those exposures.128 Further, MetLife insisted that
in tallying, FSOC relied on unjustified assumptions and guesswork,
rather than evidence-based judgments.129
B.

The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in FSOC’s Designation
Process

MetLife’s position regarding the cost-benefit aspect of the
decision is that FSOC is required to consider the costs of designation
under the final catch-all risk factor established in Dodd-Frank.130
MetLife’s argument for inclusion is that imposing the increased capital
requirements could weaken the company, thus rendering it more
susceptible to material financial distress.131 Likening the catch-all
factor to a similar provision in Michigan v. Environmental Protection
Agency,132 MetLife contends that a cost consideration falls under the
“risk-related factor” penumbra of Dodd-Frank’s statutory factors in
Section 113(a)(2) and thus merits a requirement that FSOC weigh the
costs and the benefits of designation.133
The regulatory stance, according to FSOC, is that the ten
statutory factors established in Dodd-Frank do not relate to the costs
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *32.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *32.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *33.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *34.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *51.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *54.
In Michigan, the Supreme Court held that a provision of the Clean Air Act that
directs the EPA to regulate power plants if it “finds such regulation is appropriate and
necessary” implies a requirement to weigh the costs of regulation versus the benefits.
Michigan v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
133. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *54.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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that designation may impose on the company, because the factors are
only meant to weigh whether a company’s material financial distress
could pose a threat to the country’s financial stability.134 Further, the
statute grants FSOC broad designation authority, and therefore it only
needs to consider risk-related factors that it deems appropriate.135
Additionally, the regulatory argument is that Michigan itself is
not directly applicable to the cost-benefit debate in this case.136 FSOC
contends that the district court misapplied the rule in Michigan, because
the underlying statute in that case did not indicate the types of factors
that should guide the EPA’s decision-making process, whereas DoddFrank explicitly lists the factors that are meant to guide FSOC in its
regulatory mission.137 Additionally, as noted above, FSOC argues that
even if regulatory cost could be considered under the catch-all statutory
factor, Dodd-Frank bestowed discretion as to whether that factor should
be “deemed appropriate” by FSOC.138
C.

Analysis of the Competing Views
1. Competing Interpretations of FSOC’s Guidance

One key turning point in evaluating the validity of both FSOC
and MetLife’s argument is the extent to which FSOC’s Interpretive
Guidance and Dodd-Frank’s statutory framework requires a
vulnerability assessment.139 A compelling argument, filed in an amici
curiae brief, is that the district court misinterpreted FSOC’s reference to
vulnerability in its interpretive Guidance as a requirement that it
consider the likelihood of a firm’s failure.140 The reference to

Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *51.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *52.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *52.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *52.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *53.
Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Insurance and Financial Regulation in Support
of Appellant and Reversal, at *4, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council (2016)
(No. 16-5086) WL 3453715 (C.A.D.C. June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellant].
140. Id. (“The court further erred by misinterpreting the Council’s reference to
“vulnerability” in its interpretive guidance to create a requirement that the Council consider
the likelihood of a firm’s financial failure – even though such a requirement is manifestly
inconsistent with the Dodd-Frank Act’s scheme for nonbank financial companies.”).
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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vulnerability does not necessarily mandate that FSOC undertake an
exhaustive vulnerability analysis.141 Furthermore, one could argue that
when clarifying the ambiguity in the relevant regulatory guidance, the
agency—not the courts—should be afforded deference as to the correct
reading.142 This pro-regulatory view encompasses a “well-settled”
aspect of administrative law.143 According to one law professor, the
district court contradicted this aspect of administrative law by favoring
its own understanding by giving its understanding of FSOC’s Guidance
to FSOC’s own interpretation.144
Finally, while a quantification of MetLife’s vulnerability to
material financial distress would certainly be useful, it might not
actually be possible.145 In an amicus brief on appeal, the Scholars of
Insurance and Financial Regulation group noted that there was no
“plausible way” for FSOC to meaningfully quantify the likelihood that
material financial distress at MetLife could impair market
functioning.146 Such a calculation would require a prediction of the
likelihood that a systemic crisis would occur at a future point.147 The
amicus brief noted that this would be impossible, and thus all that can
be required in FSOC’s analysis is whether there is some risk of a
systemic crisis.148
However, amicus briefs filed in support of MetLife’s position
note that there are two methods that could help with a quantitative
vulnerability assessment: stress testing and value-at-risk models.149

141. In other words, FSOC might only be required to address vulnerability, rather than
conduct a thorough assessment. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *37.
142. Bruce, supra note 106.
143. Bruce, supra note 106.
144. Bruce, supra note 106 (quoting Saule Omarova, professor of law at Cornell
University).
145. Jared Bernstein, Financial Reform and MetLife: The Judge Got it (Mostly) Wrong,
WASH. POST. (Apr. 12, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/04/
12/financial-reform-and-metlife-the-judge-got-it-mostly-wrong/?utm_term=.a56ef2c51e4f.
146. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 139, at *4.
147. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 139, at *12.
148. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 139, at *12 (“[I]f there were enough information
to permit an observer to predict that a crisis would emerge next year, then that crisis would
either be (1) avoidable, in which case market actors would avoid it; or (2) unavoidable, in
which case market actors would immediately react and the crisis would occur now. All we
can say in advance is that there is some risk of a systemic crisis.”)
149. Brief of Amici Curiae Academic Experts in Fin. Regulation in Support of Appellee
and Affirmance at *25–26, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No. 16-5086,
2016 WL 4440274 (C.A.D.C. Aug. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae for
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Stress testing, notably used on banks and bank holding companies,
provides information on expected losses to a company over a certain
time period, which could point to a workable estimate of a nonbank
company’s vulnerability to material financial distress.150 Additionally,
value-at-risk is a method of statistically modeling the risk of
investments, but estimating how such investments might lose value
under various market conditions and time periods.151 The methods
complement each other, and could be used by FSOC to measure
targeted companies’ risk exposure and vulnerability in a designation
analysis.152 Thus, these two methods provide a compelling counter to
the regulatory argument that FSOC is not capable of undertaking a
quantitative assessment of a company’s vulnerability to financial
distress.153
2. The Cost-Benefit Debate
While Michigan presents a compelling case to read in a costbenefit requirement to the FSOC-relevant Dodd-Frank provisions, it is
distinguishable from MetLife in one vital respect.154 The provision in
Dodd-Frank explicitly listed the factors that are meant to guide FSOC in
its designation process, all of which revolved around risk and did not
involve cost.155 In contrast, the underlying statute in Michigan was not
nearly as specific with its guiding factors.156 Thus, it is possible that
Michigan might not be directly relevant to MetLife’s decision because
the Dodd-Frank factors are not intended to be an exhaustive list of the
factors appropriate for designating SIFIs.157 Even if Michigan is not
distinguishable, the viability of conducting a cost-benefit analysis in

Appellee].
150. Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee, supra note 149, at *24–26.
151. Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee, supra note 149, at *25.
152. Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee, supra note 149, at *25-26.
153. A collection of law professors noted that had FSOC used the two methodologies,
“it could not have made the determination that it did.” Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee,
supra note 149, at *6.
154. Bruce, supra note 106.
155. Bruce, supra note 106.
156. Bruce, supra note 106.
157. Gillian Metzger, a professor of law at Columbia Law School, noted that the D.C.
Circuit will likely grapple with how to read and apply Michigan v. EPA to MetLife’s case.
Bruce, supra note 106.
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systemic risk scenarios is a legitimate issue.158
There is also considerable debate as to whether a cost-benefit
analysis is actually possible for FSOC to calculate.159 One barrier to
creating such an analysis is the inability of regulators to accurately
predict costs to firms because the actual act of designation creates
variables in how firms operate.160 Firms are not static entities; they
actively manage their capital and operations in response to regulation.161
For example, GE unloaded over $200 billion in lending assets in
response to its SIFI designation, which subsequently led FSOC to
rescind its designation of the company.162 In fact, MetLife itself
separated its U.S. retail segment from the rest of the company prior to
the district court’s decision, partially to avoid the regulatory impact of
increased federal regulation as a result of SIFI designation.163 While it
might be possible to predict the costs of a financial institution in
carrying an increased amount of capital,164 the prior examples illustrate
that companies are constantly evolving, and FSOC’s ability to
accurately predict costs of regulation on these malleable entities might
not be as clear cut as it would appear.165
Second, even if an accurate cost of imposed regulation on a
nonbank financial company could be calculated, the benefits side of a
cost-benefit equation would be difficult to ascertain.166 In this case, the
avoidance of a financial recession167 would be the benefit of
designation.168 Because financial recessions are statistically unlikely to

GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
See Rick Clough, GE Says Too-Big-to-Fail Exit Puts Stamp of Approval on
Overhaul, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201606-29/ge-wins-regulatory-approval-to-shed-too-big-to-fail-designation (explaining that GE
was able to shed its SIFI label by unloading businesses such as vehicle fleet financing,
commercial real estate restaurant lending, and online banking, and only retaining financial
units that support GE’s manufacturing operations).
163. GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
164. Bernstein, supra note 145.
165. GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
166. Bernstein, supra note 145.
167. The consequence of a failing SIFI, in a worst-case scenario, would be severe
market failure or recession; thus, the ultimate benefit of designation is preventing the failure
of a SIFI and a resulting recession. Bernstein, supra note 143.
168. Bernstein, supra note 145. Jared Bernstein, a senior fellow at the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, noted that conducting a cost-benefit analysis would be a “highly
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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occur, yet significantly impact the broader economy, accurately
predicting or calculating the likelihood and effect of their occurrence is
exceedingly difficult.169 Further, other aspects of a recession, such as
the long-term unemployment effects, as well as the effect on
homeowners losing their homes, are nearly impossible to establish.170
Thus, while the cost side of a cost-benefit analysis might theoretically
be possible, it would be frustratingly difficult for FSOC to quantify or
otherwise measure the beneficial effects of SIFI designation.171
V. CONCLUSION
While possible to view the court’s ruling as a simple technical
decision based on FSOC’s failure to adhere to its own interpretive
Guidance, the decision raises substantive and intricate questions on
appeal.172 First, there is an important dialogue regarding the flexibility
that FSOC should be given regarding its decision-making process.173 In
general, FSOC should be given leeway in interpreting and applying its
own Guidance in accordance with standard administrative law
principles.174 However, in this case, the lack of clarity between FSOC’s
Final Determination and its Guidance regarding vulnerability
assessments goes beyond this standard deference.175 If nonbank
companies are to be subject to designation as SIFIs and increased
regulation, the Guidance promulgated by FSOC should provide clear
standards as to how exactly the risk factors in Dodd-Frank will trigger
this SIFI designation.176 As it stands, FSOC’s Guidance seems to
require it to assess a potential SIFI’s vulnerability to material distress;
thus, FSOC must either update its Guidance to incorporate its current
unrealistic endeavor.” Id; see also GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
169. Bernstein, supra note 145.
170. Bernstein, supra note 145.
171. Bernstein, supra note 145.
172. See Norbert Michel, MetLife Wins First Legal Challenge To SIFI Process, Still
Need To Get Rid Of FSOC, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
norbertmichel/2016/04/18/metlife-wins-first-legal-challenge-to-sifi-process-still-need-toget-rid-of-fsoc/#29c765c171c5 (explaining that while MetLife may have won the case on
technical grounds, the ruling means that FSOC will now be burdened with much more
stringent analytical requirement).
173. Bruce, supra note 106.
174. Bruce, supra note 106.
175. Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee, supra note 147, at *31.
176. GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
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interpretation or utilize some sort of methodology, such as stress testing
or value-at-risk models, to assess vulnerability.177
Second, the cost-benefit requirement debate, highlighted by the
district court’s opinion, also presents a question of the role of costbenefit analysis in FSOC’s regulatory methodology.178 Michigan is
likely distinguishable from this case because Dodd-Frank lists the
factors that FSOC must consider, with the catch-all factor applicable
only at FSOC’s discretion.179 This directly contrasts with the relevant
statutory language in Michigan, which requires the EPA to consider all
“appropriate” factors.180 This distinction, coupled with the difficulties
present in calculating the costs versus the benefits of designation,181
likely renders null the cost-benefit requirement imposed by the district
court.182
The outcome of this appeal also rests within a larger context of
the debate over the role and scale of regulators and the deference judges
ought to give to federal financial regulators.183 The fact that two of the
three judges selected to sit on the panel for the D.C. Circuit’s hearing
were appointed by President Obama does not bode well for MetLife and
its appeal.184 Edward Mills, an analyst at investment bank FBR & Co.,
stated that the panel was a “bad draw” for MetLife, opining that the two
judges appointed by President Obama are likely to be more deferential
to FSOC and the government’s scope of authority than the district
court.185 However, the election of President Donald J. Trump looms
large over this matter: FSOC is reportedly an aspect of Dodd-Frank that
the present administration is considering eliminating entirely.186 Thus,
the debate over MetLife’s designation may prove to be a moot
GONZALEZ, supra note 80.
Bernstein, supra note 145 (stating that those familiar with the legal issues
surrounding this aspect of the judgment deem the aspect unlikely to survive the appeal).
179. Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at *24.
180. Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at *24.
181. See supra Part IV.C.
182. See GONZALEZ, supra note 80 (finding that the mechanics of requiring a costbenefit analysis under Dodd-Frank would leave an “open question” to regulators).
183. Bruce, supra note 106.
184. Ackerman, supra note 103.
185. Ackerman, supra note 103. Further, Robert Jackson of Columbia law school was
quoted as saying: “If MetLife was hoping for this to be affirmed, they’ve got to be
disappointed in this panel.” Id.
186. John Heltman, FSOC on Chopping Block After Republican Victories, AM. BANKER
(Nov. 9, 2016).
177.
178.
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discussion, even if the circuit court rules in FSOC’s favor.187
FREDERICK MATTHEW NORCHI

187.

Id.

